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We show that economic incentives affect the commercial value of inventions 
generated in universities. Using data for 102 U.S. universities during the period 
1991-1999, we find that universities which give higher royalty shares to 
academic scientists generate higher license income, controlling for other factors 
including university size, quality, research funding and technology licensing 
inputs. We provide evidence that this is due to the fact that public universities 
are less effective at commercialising inventions, which weakens the incentive 
effect of higher royalty shares. Other findings include: 1) there is a Laffer effect 
in private universities: raising the inventor's royalty share increases the license 
income retained by the university; 2) the incentive effect works primarily by 
increasing the quality of inventions, and 3) the incentive effect appears to 
operate both by raising faculty effort and by sorting academic scientists across 
universities. 
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Universities are an important source of technical change. By the end of the 1990￿ s, they
accounted for about 50 percent of basic research and almost ￿ve percent of domestic patent
grants in the U.S. (National Science Board, 2000). Academic research has had real e⁄ects on
the economy by increasing the productivity of private sector R&D and the growth in total factor
productivity (Ja⁄e, 1989; Adams, 1990). These bene￿ts work through knowledge spillovers from
academia to the rest of the economy, and through the licensing of university-owned inventions
to private ￿rms.1 This licensing activity facilitates the transfer of new scienti￿c knowledge and
the commercial development of these inventions by the private sector. Technology licensing
activity has grown dramatically in the past two decades.2 The number of U.S. patents awards
to university inventors rose from 500 in 1982 to more than 3,100 in 1998. The number of
licenses executed on university inventions grew more than three-fold during the last decade,
from 1,278 to 4,362, and gross licensing revenues increased nearly seven-fold, from $186 million
to nearly $1.3 billion.
Given the importance of university research for long term growth and productivity, it is
critical to understand what drives academic research and technology licensing activity. Is it a
purely intellectual pursuit, as many commentators claim, or do economic incentives in￿ uence
how academic scientists structure their research activities? In one of the ￿rst papers to analyse
theoretically the incentive e⁄ects of various award schemes to basic research at universities (e.g.,
NSF awards) and their economic e¢ ciency, Lazear (1997) points out that ￿even research with
direct marketability will not be undertaken at the appropriate rate unless the inventor is entitled
to the full rents from the resulting advance￿ .
1There is substantial evidence of R&D spillovers (e.g., Ja⁄e, 1989; Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg, 2002; Adams,
1990, 2002). University research spillovers tend to be geographically localized as might be expected if direct
knowledge transfers are important (Ja⁄e, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993; Audretsch and Stephan, 1996).
There is also a growing empirical literature on university patenting and technology transfer (e.g., Henderson,
Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg, 1998; Thursby and Kemp, 2002; Siegel, Waldman and Link, 2003) and university research
productivity (Adams and Griliches, 1998).
2Part of this rapid growth in university innovation and licensing activity is due to the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980 (Patent and Trademarks Amendments Act, PL 965-17) which gave universities the right to
patent and a mandate to license discoveries made with federally sponsored research to the private sector. By the
year 2000, nearly all American research universities had established, or expanded, technology licensing o¢ ces
and introduced explicit intellectual property policies and royalty sharing arrangements for academic scientists.
1In this paper we take a ￿rst step in examining this issue by presenting econometric evi-
dence on the role of economic incentives in shaping university research and licensing outcomes.
Speci￿cally, we examine how the cash ￿ ow rights from university inventions (the share of license
royalties received by academic inventors) a⁄ect the licensing value of inventions generated by
universities. In the United States, university intellectual property policies typically grant the
university exclusive control rights over inventions. However, in all U.S. research universities
the royalty income derived from licensing inventions is shared between the inventor and various
parts of the university according to speci￿ed royalty sharing schedules. We show that there
is substantial variation in these royalty sharing arrangements across U.S. research universities,
and use this cross-sectional variation to estimate the e⁄ect of royalty sharing arrangements on
license income.
We develop a simple model in which scientists allocate e⁄ort to produce more research
projects, to improve the quality of each project, and to other responsibilities (e.g., teaching).
Scientists attach private value to royalty income, publications and teaching, and face shadow
prices of di⁄erent types of e⁄ort set by the university. The model predicts that a rise in the
inventor￿ s share of royalties increases total revenues from licensed inventions. We test this
prediction with university-level data from the Association of University Technology Managers,
combined with information on the distribution of royalty shares, which we collected from the
university websites.
This paper makes two main empirical contributions. First, we show that academic re-
search and inventive activity respond to monetary incentives. This ￿nding is important because
it means that the design of intellectual property rights, and other forms of incentives, in acad-
emic institutions can have real e⁄ects on economic growth and productivity. Second, we show
that the response to incentives is much stronger (and more signi￿cant) in private universities
than in public ones. Controlling for a variety of other determinants, including university size,
quality, R&D funding and local demand conditions, private universities with higher royalty
shares generate higher levels of license income. In private universities, the incentive e⁄ect is
strong enough to produce a La⁄er e⁄ect, where raising the inventor￿ s royalty share would in-
crease the license revenue actually retained by the university. We also show that technology
licensing o¢ ces are more productive in private universities, suggesting that private institutions
2have more e⁄ective, commercially-oriented technology transfer activity.
We argue that this di⁄erence in TLO e⁄ectiveness (in terms of generating license income)
can help explain the greater faculty responsiveness to royalty incentives in private universities.
Because control rights over inventions reside with the university, the TLO e⁄ectively has exclu-
sive rights to commercialise inventions disclosed by the faculty (unless expressly waived). As
the ￿gatekeeper￿ , the TLO￿ s e⁄ectiveness at ￿nding licensees, negotiating license agreements
and other aspects of commercialising inventions, directly a⁄ects the monetary returns to the
faculty scientist. Raising the royalty share should have a smaller e⁄ect on incentives if the fac-
ulty scientist anticipates that the TLO will be ine⁄ective at commercialising her inventions. To
examine this explanation we need to identify how public and private TLO￿ s di⁄er in ways that
in￿ uence their e⁄ectiveness. For this purpose we developed a survey questionnaire for directors
of TLO￿ s in public and private universities. The survey indicates that TLO￿ s in private univer-
sities are signi￿cantly more likely to use performance-based pay, to be much less constrained
in their freedom of operation by state laws and regulations, and more likely to be focused on
generating license income as compared to more ￿social￿ objectives such as promoting local
and regional development. These ￿ndings provide reasons for the di⁄erence in e⁄ectiveness in
public and private TLO￿ s, and thereby a possible explanation for the private-public di⁄erential
response to royalty sharing incentives.
The theoretical model serves to organize the empirical work, but it is very stylized. For
example, we do not model the academic labor market and thus the equilibrium allocation of
scientists across universities. As a consequence, the key empirical ￿nding in this paper ￿that
royalty incentives matter ￿may be due both to the e⁄ect of such incentives on research e⁄ort of
individual scientists and to sorting behavior whereby universities o⁄er higher royalty share to
attract more productive scientists. Going beyond the model, in the empirical work we provide
some evidence that both mechanisms may be at work, i.e., that the incentive e⁄ects work
partly by inducing sorting of scientists across universities as well as by increasing scientists￿
e⁄ort levels.
We emphasise that this paper does not provide a normative analysis of technology licens-
ing activity in universities. The trend toward greater commercialisation of university inventions
may have both bene￿ts and costs. What we do here is to show that the bene￿ts to universities,
3in the form of license income, are strongly a⁄ected by how incentives are set. Of course, there
may also be costs associated with greater emphasis on invention and licensing: for example,
less ￿open science￿in universities, a shift away from more basic towards more applied research,
and so on. The public debate has focused heavily on such potential costs, but there is very
little systematic evidence of these aspects to date. We do not address these costs in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the data.
Section 3 presents the analytical framework that underlies the empirical work. In Section 4 we
present nonparametric evidence on the relationship between license income and inventor royalty
shares. Section 5 presents the basic econometric results and their implications, including a test
of whether incentives work both through e⁄ort and sorting of faculty. We also examine whether
the incentive e⁄ect works mainly on the quantity or quality of inventions. Section 6 provides
robustness checks. Brief concluding remarks follow.
2 Data Description
The data assembled for this project came from three main sources: 1) the Annual Licensing
Surveys for the years 1991-1999 published by the Association of University Technology Man-
agers (AUTM), 2) the 1993 National Survey of Graduate Faculty conducted by the National
Research Council (NRC), and 3) royalty sharing arrangements downloaded from technology
licensing o¢ ces￿websites. De￿nitions of the main variables and a description of the sample
selection process are provided in a data Appendix.
The AUTM surveys provide information on licensing income, number of licenses, number
of inventions reported to the TLO (invention disclosures), characteristics of the technology
licensing o¢ ce (TLO), and R&D funding from external sources in universities, medical research
institutes and patent management ￿rms.
In the empirical analysis we need to control for di⁄erences across universities in faculty
size and scholarly quality. Data on the size and quality of university doctoral programs were
obtained from the 1993 NRC survey. For each university we used data on doctoral programs
in twenty-three di⁄erent ￿elds of science.3 We measure university size as the total number of
3See the Appendix for a list of these ￿elds. Further details on the classi￿cation can be found in Appendices
K, L and N in Goldberger et al. (1995).
4faculty members in the doctoral programs in these twenty-three ￿elds. We use three measures of
university quality: the number of citations per faculty, the number of publications per faculty,
and a scholarly quality rating score between zero (￿not su¢ cient for doctoral education￿ ) and
￿ve (￿distinguished￿ ). The NRC survey reports these variables at the program level but we
aggregated them to the university level using faculty size weights. The size and quality variables
do not vary over time.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the 102 universities in our sample. The univer-
sities in our sample account for 56.1 percent of the total license income reported by AUTM in
1995, and 68.1 percent of the total in 1999. The sample universities generate 3.4 million dollars
of licensing income per year, on average. Not surprisingly, this income is unevenly distributed
across universities: the median licensing income is just $620,000, but, the top universities earn
over $40 million per year while others have zero licensing income. Normalizing by the number
of active licenses (row 2) does not eliminate this variation. Half of the universities have licenses
generating less than $17,000 on average, while the top 5 percent of the universities have licenses
generating over $111,000. The same uneven pattern is observed in the number of invention dis-
closures, although some of the variance in disclosures is related to faculty size (rows 3 and
4). In sum, the distributions of licensing value and the number of invention disclosures are
very right-skewed: only a few universities produce large numbers of inventions, and only a few
inventions are very valuable.
The three measures for university quality are reported in rows 6-8. Citations per faculty
captures both the quantity and quality of publications and exhibits the highest dispersion across
universities. Technology licensing o¢ ces at most universities are quite small, with a mean of
about three full-time professionals. The average age of TLO￿ s in 1999 was 16, re￿ ecting the
stimulus to commercialize university inventions given by the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act.
Our third source of data was information on the distribution of licensing income between
faculty scientists and the university, i.e., on the arrangements for sharing the royalties generated
by the licensed inventions. This information was downloaded from the websites of individual
technology licensing o¢ ces during the summer of 2001 and it constitutes the novel aspect of
our data.
The intellectual property policies of the universities usually state that a percentage of
5the net income received by the university from licensing an invention is retained by the inventor
and the rest is allocated to the inventor￿ s lab, department, college and to the university. The
criterion we used for identifying the inventor share is that the inventor must gain either cash
￿ ow rights or direct control rights over the income. Thus, when the university IP policy states
that the share accruing to the lab was under the control of the inventor, we added it to the
inventor￿ s share, but otherwise we did not. We call this the inventor￿ s royalty share.
The observed royalty shares were those in e⁄ect (and posted) in 2001. Because we will
examine the e⁄ect of these royalty shares on inventive outcomes, we were concerned by our
inability to identify any changes that might have occurred in these shares during the 1991-1999
period (when outcomes measures are available). We sent a question by e-mail about this to the
TLO￿ s in the sample and found that 70 percent of the universities did not change their royalty
distribution during 1991-1999. Thus, for most universities the royalty sharing rates remained
unchanged during the sample period. In fact, in many cases the arrangements were set in the
early 1980s and never changed.4
In 58 universities the inventor royalty share is a ￿xed percentage of the license income
generated by an invention (we call these linear royalty schedules). Interestingly, in the other 44
universities these royalty shares vary with the level of license income generated by an invention
(we call these non-linear royalty schedules). Because the income intervals di⁄er across univer-
sities, we divided the license income into seven intervals based on the most frequently observed
structure (in US$): 0-10,000, 10,000-50,000, 50,000-100,000, 100,000-300,000, 300,000-0.5 mil-
lion, 0.5-1.0 million, and over 1 million.5
Table 2 presents the main features of the royalty share data. The mean inventor￿ s share
is 41 percent among the 58 universities using linear royalty schedules, but there is substantial
cross-sectional variation. About 25 percent of these universities have royalty shares lower than
a third, while the top 25 percent have royalty shares larger than 50 percent. The royalty shares
4In total, 53 universities responded to this query. Of the 16 that reported a change in royalty shares during
1991-99, only 11 reported the pre- and post-change royalty sharing agreements. In these cases, we updated the
data according to the information received. In the remaining 5 universities, we used the shares reported in 2001.
5In the many cases where our selected interval did not correspond to the interval chosen by the university, we
recomputed royalty shares with the correct weights. For example, if a university reports a 50 percent share for
income less than 5,000 and 40 percent share for income above 5,000, this would appear as an 45 percent share
in the ￿rst interval (0-10,000) and an 40 percent share in all the remaining intervals.
6in the 44 universities with non-linear schedules display even larger cross-sectional variability
within each license income interval. For these universities we compute an expected royalty
share by weighting the average share in each income interval by the probability of observing
license income in that interval. These probabilities were estimated non-parametrically from
the distribution of license incomes over all years in the AUTM sample. Let vit denote license
income per invention disclosure in university i in year t: There are 723 di⁄erent values for v in
the sample. We ￿rst estimated the density f(vit) by kernel methods at these values. We then
computed an average royalty share for each value of v;
_
s(v); using the royalty schedule for each





Of course, when the royalty schedule is linear, the expected royalty rate is simply the reported
(constant) share.7
The estimated density function of v shows the extreme dispersion and skewness of license
income per invention disclosure (see Figure 1).8 Nearly all of the weight is on the ￿rst two
income intervals￿ 50.2 percent in the 0-$10,000 interval and 46.1 in the $10,000-$50,000 bracket.
This feature shows that taking a simple average of all sharing rates in a nonlinear schedule would
be inappropriate. In fact, for practical purposes a good approximation is simply to average the
￿rst two sharing rates.
Using the estimated f(v)0s, the expected royalty share averages to 51 percent across
universities, higher than the average royalty share in the universities having linear schedules
(Table 2). The expected inventor￿ s share also exhibits a large variability ranging from 20 to




I(0 ￿ v ￿ v1) +
s1v1 + s2(v ￿ v1)
v
I(v1 < v ￿ v2) +
s1v1 + s2v2 + s3(v ￿ v2)I(v > v2)
v
where I(￿) is an indicator function.
7Two other points should be noted. First, we also used yearly license income divided by the cumulative
number of active licenses as a measure of v and obtained essentially the same estimates of s. The two estimates
di⁄er by at most 1.7 percentage points, and the average di⁄erence is 0.7 percentage points. We normalized by
disclosures because data on cumulative licenses is available only since 1995 resulting in a smaller number of
observations. Second, one might want to estimate separate density functions for sub-categories of the pooled
data￿ e.g., for di⁄erent technology ￿elds￿ but we do not have enough data to do this successfully.
8Such skewness is typical of distributions of the returns to innovation (Schankerman, 1998).
797 percent. This remarkable variability across universities is clearly seen in Figure 2, where
the histogram and a nonparametric estimate of the density of the expected royalty share are
displayed.
Another striking feature of Table 2 is that inventor royalty shares are either constant or
decline in the level of license income per invention￿royalty retention is regressive (equivalently,
the university ￿ tax￿on inventors is progressive). On average, they start at 53 percent in the
lowest interval and decline to 30 percent for inventions generating over $1 million. This fea-
ture holds in every quartile of the cross-sectional distribution and, in fact, it holds for every
university in our sample with non-linear royalty schedules.9
In a ￿rst attempt to understand the determinants of the variation in royalty shares across
universities, we split the sample into four quartiles de￿ned by university characteristics (e.g.,
faculty size) and computed the mean royalty share in each quartile. Table 3 summarises the
results. Royalty shares are not related to faculty size, the number of citations per faculty, or the
size of the TLO o¢ ce (measured by the number of TLO professionals per faculty). In fact, the
hypothesis that the mean royalty rate is the same across the four quartiles of the distribution of
each characteristic cannot be rejected (last row). Apparently there is no signi￿cant correlation
between royalty shares and a variety of university characteristics, taken individually.
These simple bivariate comparisons also hold in a regression context. Table 4 presents the
results from regressing the royalty shares on the above characteristics and additional controls,
using the time-averages of the variables (the between-university regression). In the ￿rst column
the royalty share is regressed on faculty size, and the three proxies for university quality. None
of these regressors is signi￿cant, nor is the regression as a whole (p-value = 0.25). Adding
the scienti￿c composition of the faculty￿ the shares of total faculty in each of six main science
9Regressive royalty schedules give inventors an incentive to discover many small-valued inventions rather than
a single valuable one, which seems odd if universities prefer quality to quantity of inventions. However, it may
be possible to rationalise such schedules by appealing to optimal taxation theory. That literature can generate
progressive tax schedules when there is uncertainty to e⁄ort. The intuition is that, when high income ex post
is largely due to a favorable resolution of uncertainty, the incentive cost of higher marginal taxation is lower
(Tuomala, 1990). This argument may also apply to research e⁄ort, if the quality of the project is unknown ex
ante to the scientist. However, if the inventor can distinguish between low and high quality projects in making
e⁄ort decisions, then optimal incentives should involve a progressive inventor royalty to compensate for the
higher marginal cost of producing high-valued inventions. Of course, ￿ fairness￿considerations may also play a
role in how universities share royalties.
8￿elds10￿ does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on inventor￿ s shares (column 2). This is interesting,
since academic scientists usually sit on the governance committees that set these rates.
In column 3 we add two features of the TLO: size, measured by the number of full time
professionals, and experience, measured by its (average) age. There is some evidence that
royalty shares are negatively related to the age of the TLO. Whatever the explanation for this,
we should not put too much emphasis on this ￿nding because the quantitative e⁄ect is very
small. A one-year increase in TLO age is associated with a decline in royalty share of a third
of a percentage point.
Adding controls for the level of R&D funding for and the average salary at the univer-
sity level do not alter these results (column 4). Interestingly, the average salary is negatively
correlated with the expected royalty share: the point estimate implies that an additional thou-
sand dollars reduces the share by a quarter of a percentage point. This suggests a trade-o⁄
between high-powered incentives and salaries. The average salary coe¢ cient, however, is not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.11
The private university dummy is also not signi￿cant. The average inventor royalty shares
for public and private universities are almost the same: 46 and 44 percent, respectively, and
not statistically di⁄erent (p-value = 0.48). Moreover, there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the
empirical distribution of royalty share in private and public universities.
To summarize, the two salient features of observed royalty shares are their variability
across universities and their regressiveness in the level of license income. Moreover, we have
shown that inventors￿expected royalty shares are only weakly related to observed university
characteristics. This raises the question of whether existing royalty distribution schemes have
been set in any systematic or strategic way. Putting this aside, one may be tempted to conclude
that these shares do not matter for academic innovation and technology licensing performance.
Is royalty sharing a purely distributive matter, or does it a⁄ect the ￿size of the pie￿ , i.e.,
innovative performance? In this paper we take the royalty shares as given and exploit their
10See the Appendix for de￿nitions.
11This estimate is likely to be biased towards zero due to measurement error in the average salary. We use a
university-based average of salaries, but we would really like to have the average salary of faculty in hard science
departments.
9cross-sectional variation to identify whether they have an e⁄ect on inventive activity.
3 Analytical Framework
There are two basic channels through which royalty incentives to faculty can a⁄ect inventive
outcomes in universities. First, a higher royalty share can induce faculty to devote greater
e⁄ort to more commercially-oriented research than to other types of research, teaching or
administrative activities. We call this the e⁄ort channel. Second, a higher royalty share can
attract more productive and commercially-oriented researchers in a world where faculty di⁄ers
in their research productivities. This results in a reallocation or sorting of more productive
faculty into universities with stronger royalty incentives. We call this the sorting channel. Of
course, both mechanisms may be operating at the same time.
Here we develop the e⁄ort model in some detail in order to organize the empirical work.
With the available university-level data, both the e⁄ort and sorting mechanisms generate the
same prediction and thus may appear to be observationally equivalent: higher royalty shares
lead to higher inventive output (e.g., licensing income) in both models. To di⁄erentiate properly
between the two models, we would need data on the ￿ ows of faculty and their quality across
universities, which to the best of our knowledge are not available in a systematic form. Nev-
ertheless, in Section 5.5 we develop one simple implication of the sorting model which can be
tested with our data. A more complete assessment of the e⁄ort and sorting e⁄ects is important
because their policy implications are very di⁄erent. The e⁄ort model implies that strengthen-
ing royalty incentives would increase aggregate inventive output, whereas a pure sorting model
would imply that this would only redistribute inventive output across universities.12
We assume that academic scientists use a ￿xed amount of e⁄ort (work time) T to perform
three tasks: starting new research projects, improving their quality, and teaching/administrative
activities. The number of inventions n generated by a researcher depends on the scientist￿ s ef-
fort, z; devoted to starting new projects, given by n = n(z): This invention function satis￿es
the usual properties n0(z) ￿ 0;n00(z) ￿ 0 and n(0) > 0: Each invention has the same initial
quality v0. By investing research e⁄ort q into a (single) project, the researcher can transform
12Unless there are large externalities (spillovers) from concentrating more productive faculty in one location.
10it into an invention potentially worth
v(q) = v0 (q)"
where  (q) > 1 is increasing and concave and " is a multiplicative shock independent of q; with
mean value normalized to one and distribution function G. The shock " is observed after the
two types of e⁄ort are invested. As there are no ex-ante di⁄erences among the n inventions,
the inventor invests the same level of e⁄ort q in each of them.13
We assume that the e⁄ort constraint is binding so that the remaining e⁄ort, T￿z￿n(z)q;
is spent in teaching and administrative activities. The research activities generate n inventions
with average commercial potential v; as well as academic publications. Academic publications
depend on the number of projects n and their quality v; so expected publications depend
ultimately on z and q, p(z;q): However, the partial e⁄ects of quantity and quality e⁄ort on
publications do not need to be positive if there is a con￿ ict between commercially-oriented and
academic research.
We assume that all inventions are disclosed to the TLO and that the TLO then chooses
whether or not to license the invention depending on the observed value of the idea. The TLO
licenses an invention if expected license income covers the ￿xed cost of licensing, which includes
￿nding suitable licensees, negotiating terms, and enforcing contracts. We model the selection
rule as follows: license the invention if v > v: This implies that, given e⁄ort q, an invention is
licensed if " >
v





of all inventions is licensed.14
The TLO is in charge of compiling a list of all inventions made by faculty and licensing
them to private ￿rms. If the TLO licenses the invention, it earns revenue ￿v, where 0 < ￿ ￿
1 re￿ ects the e⁄ectiveness of the TLO￿ s licensing activities. The amount v is the maximal
potential income derived from licensing the invention, which should re￿ ect the most favorable
13An equivalent formulation would be to allow the initial value of the idea to be random and unknown to
the researcher when the decision on e⁄ort q is made. We need to have some form of uncertainty in the model
because otherwise the scientist would either set q = 0 or set q at a level to ensure that any developed idea would
pass the TLO selection rule (see below in the text). But this is not consistent with the data: the ratio of licenses
executed to invention disclosures in a given year is about 30 percent, on average.
14This way of speci￿ying the TLO licensing decision is consistent with new survey data we gathered from
TLOs, described brie￿ y in Section 5.3. This was the licensing criterion most frequently cited by respondents.
On the theoretical level, Macho-Stadler, Perez-Castillo and Veugelers (2004) develop a model in which the TLO
has an incentive to shelve some projects, i.e., not commercialize them, because of reputation e⁄ects.
11license fee and royalties schedule among all the potential licensees. The actual license income
depends on how good the TLO is at identifying the best match and negotiating the best
agreement.15 If the invention is not licensed, it earns zero revenue.
The expected license revenues generated by inputs (z;q) are





When n0(z) > 0 we have that @r
@z > 0; and when  0(q) > 0; we have @r
@q > 0: Notice that
quality e⁄ort has two e⁄ects: it raises the value of the idea and it increases the probability that
it will be licensed by the TLO.
The academic scientist derives utility from research and from time spent in teaching. The
utility from research is composed of the expected monetary bene￿t accruing to the scientist￿ s
inventions (royalty income, sr) and from publications,
U(z;q) = V (sr(z;q);p(z;q);T ￿ z ￿ n(z)q) (2)
where p denotes expected publications.16
We assume that U(z;q) is concave. Of course, we require that U be increasing in some
region of (z;q) but it is quite possible that, because of diminishing returns, at some point
investing more e⁄ort in research decreases U because of the disutilities attached to less teaching
and possibly fewer academic publications.
We assume that the costs associated with research e⁄ort, C(z;q); are convex. The
marginal costs Cz and Cq represent the opportunity cost of a unit of e⁄ort invested in starting
more projects to the inventor (resp. investment in quality per project). These parameters
re￿ ect the university￿ s valuation of the two types of research e⁄ort and teaching time. The
university control these shadow prices by setting promotion criteria and other rewards.17 The
faculty scientist￿ s objective is to choose (z;q) to maximize
15Jensen and Thursby (2001) analyse optimal contract design for university technology transfer.
16In what follows we assume that s does not depend on v since this is not central to the argument.
17We view this speci￿cation as a reduced form of some underlying model of the academic labour market.
The shadow prices imposed by the university presumably re￿ ect the marginal products of research e⁄orts (z;q)
in terms of the university￿ s objectives. These may di⁄er from the utility value attached by the scientist if
their objectives are not well aligned. Con￿ ict of interest provisions, which are commonly found in university
intellectual property policies, suggest that problems of alignment do exist.
12￿(z;q) ￿ U(z;q) ￿ C(z;q)














￿ Vtn(z) = Cq
where Vj (j = r;p;t) is the marginal utility from license income, publications and teaching,
respectively.
At the optimum, the scientist balances the marginal utility associated with more research
￿which itself depends on the various positive and negative contributions of the di⁄erent ac-
tivities ￿with its marginal cost. To ensure that optimal research e⁄ort levels are positive, we
require that ￿(z;q) is increasing at (0;0):
The important point is that, provided the scientist cares about the monetary returns
from inventions, Vr > 0; the royalty share a⁄ects e⁄ort because it determines the scientist￿ s
expected income. We have:
Proposition 1 Provided that Vr > 0 and ￿zq is not too negative, optimal research e⁄ort levels
are rising in the inventor￿ s royalty share s:18
The scientist￿ s expected income is also determined by the e⁄ectiveness of the TLO in
exploiting the potential value of the invention v: For this reason, TLO e⁄ectiveness should
also in￿ uence research e⁄ort. In our modelling approach, the index of TLO￿ s e¢ ciency at
performing this task, ￿; enters the problem in the same way s does. Incentives can be increased
either by distributing a larger share of the invention value to faculty or by realizing a higher
fraction of the full potential of these inventions. Thus, ￿ a⁄ects research e⁄orts (z;q) in the
same way as s:
In short, the model implies that, under certain conditions, research e⁄ort z and q depend
positively on (s;￿). This is the implication we would like to to test empirically. Unfortunately,
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zq > 0 by the second order conditions. But ￿zs = Vr
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@z > 0 and ￿qs = Vr
@r
@q > 0.





ds > 0 provided ￿zq is not ￿too negative￿ .
13data on research e⁄orts are not available. However, we observe license income which, according
to the model, re￿ ects these e⁄orts. In fact, since revenue per faculty, r(z;q); increases with z
and q the model implies that r(z;q) also rises with s:
Expected licensing revenues at the university equals (1) multiplied by the number of
university faculty, F:





Because s increases both z and q; and thus r; total university expected license income also
increases with s: This is the implication we set out to test with the data.
To obtain our estimating equation, we transform (3) into logs and approximate the
nonlinear terms involving s and ￿ by ￿s + e ￿ log￿: This yields









￿ ￿s + e ￿ log￿ + logv0 + logF + terms involving G;v and v0
We do not observe ￿ directly. We use a set of observed variables x to proxy for log￿:
e ￿ log￿ = ￿￿ + ￿; E(￿jx) = 0; and collapse all the other factors a⁄ecting license revenues into
a vector !: This results in the estimating equation
logR = ￿s + x￿ + !￿ + u (5)
where u captures the deviation of logR from its expected value, as well as functional form
approximation and proxying errors.19
The vector ! includes variables that account for di⁄erences in license revenues across
universities, other than through di⁄erences in s and x; including: (log) faculty size, for which
we expect an elasticity of about unity, and the number of citations per faculty to account
for initial quality (v0); which should also have a positive e⁄ect because inventions are more
valuable and are more likely to be licensed the higher is v0: Di⁄erences in the distribution of
19We now abuse notation by denoting observed license revenues by R:
14quality shocks, G; across universities are captured by di⁄erences in their research orientation,
measured by the shares of faculty employed in each of six science ￿elds (see Appendix), and by
the amount of R&D funding available to the university. These variables are also part of !:
We emphasize that the estimating equation (5) is not an invention production function.
The latter cannot be estimated because we do not observe the inputs z and q: Rather, equation
(5) is interpreted as a reduced form equation specifying the (exogenous) drivers of licensing
income. These drivers, s and ￿; operate through the unobserved research e⁄ort levels and the
TLO licensing behavior. This last point is important. The observed data are not a random
sample of all inventions generated by the university faculty. The scientist selects which inven-
tions are worth reporting and the TLO selects which inventions are worth marketing. We have
taken only the TLO selection into account in the modelling framework, i.e., we conditioned
on disclosed inventions. As equation (3) makes clear, the estimated incentives e⁄ects include
these TLO selection e⁄ects.20
We assume that the royalty share is exogenous in equation (5) and estimate its para-
meters by ordinary least squares. We discuss the validity of this assumption in Section 5.2.
The data used to estimate equation (5) consist of an unbalanced panel of 102 universities over
9 years, 1991-1999 (see the Appendix for details). However, panel data estimation methods
that allow for a correlation between the royalty share and unobserved, time-invariant deter-
minants of license revenues ￿such as ￿xed e⁄ects or ￿rst di⁄erences ￿are of limited use here
because the royalty share does not vary over time in 90 percent of the observations. We rely on
cross-sectional variation to identify the incentive e⁄ect on license income. We use a consistent
estimator of the covariance matrix that allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial corre-
lation within universities, but we assume that disturbances are uncorrelated across universities;
i.e., standard errors are clustered at the university level.21
20The estimated incentive e⁄ect will also include any e⁄ect of royalty shares on the willingness of faculty to
report inventions to the TLO. Such nonreporting bias can easily be incorporated into the model, but since we
cannot identify the separate selection e⁄ects we refrain from doing so.
21There is one estimation issue that arises from the computation of the expected royalty share for universities
with nonlinear royalty schedules. The density estimates used to compute the expected royalty share are based
on the observed unconditional distribution of license income per disclosure. The model, however, says that the
distribution of license income per disclosure depends on the control variables s; x and !: In order to account for
this, we used an iterative procedure whereby the residuals from an initial license income per disclosure (i.e., v)
regression are used to recompute the kernel density estimates and the expected royalty shares. We found that
154 Nonparametric Evidence
Because we showed that royalty shares, s, are mostly unrelated to other university observables,
we are arguably justi￿ed in examining the expectation of license revenue conditional on s and
interpreting this relationship as causal. The advantage of abstracting from other determinants
of license income is that we can easily estimate this conditional expectation non-parametrically,
i.e., we can let the data determine the shape of the conditional expectation function, rather
than imposing a linear or log-linear form (as in (5)). We estimate the expectation of license
income per faculty conditional on s; using a Fan (1992) locally weighted regression smoother.
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is clearly increasing in s and somewhat non-linear: although income is not very
responsive to economic incentives at the low range of the royalty shares this is strikingly reversed
at shares above 35-40 percent. From Table 2 we know that at least half the universities have
expected royalty shares above 40 percent. Also notice the di⁄erential response to incentives
between private and public universities. These results suggest that university ownership type
is an important determinant of how responsive license income is to royalty incentives. To verify
these preliminary results and to get some quantitative assessment of the estimated relationships
and their precision, we proceed to a regression analysis of the data.
5 Regression Analysis
Table 5 presents estimates for equation (5). There are 102 universities in the sample but,
because of zero license revenues and other missing data, the regressions in columns (1) and (2)
are based on 98 and 97 universities, respectively.22 We begin by controlling for faculty size,
after one iteration the average di⁄erence in the computed royalty shares for the nonlinear schedules was only 1.3
percentage points, or about 2.8 percent of the mean royalty share. Moreover, using the royalty shares computed
after one iteration gave estimated coe¢ cients very close to those obtained using the expected royalty shares
based on the unconditional distribution of v: The parameter estimates we report are based on the unconditional
distribution.
22There are 749 observations with non-missing license income data. 18 observations have zero license income,
reducing the sample to 731. Using zeros for the observations with zero license revenues does not change the results
(if anything, it makes the royalty e⁄ect stronger and more signi￿cant). Another 14 observations have missing
data on other regressors (TLO size, TLO age, R&D funding) further reducing the sample to 717 observations.
See the Appendix for details.
16citations per faculty and year dummies. As implied by equation (3), and expected from the
non-parametric analysis, the royalty share coe¢ cient is indeed positive but it is also moderately
signi￿cant (p-value = 0.091). The income elasticity of faculty size is above one, but the null
hypothesis that it is unity cannot be rejected at the 0.10 signi￿cance level. Also, as implied by
equation (3), higher quality universities have signi￿cantly higher license income.
The sign and magnitude of the estimates is preserved when we add the other controls
in equation (5). In column (2), which we treat as the baseline speci￿cation, we add the
determinants of ￿ ￿ TLO size and age ￿ and the other variables in ! : R&D funding and
the shares of total faculty in each of the main science ￿elds.23 The important point to notice is
that the estimated incentive e⁄ect of royalty shares remains essentially the same as in column
(1), but it is more precisely estimated (p-value=0.049). The regression results point to strong
and signi￿cant e⁄ects of incentives on license revenues. Increasing the inventor￿ s royalty share
by 10 percentage points results in a 19 percent increases in revenues. This sizeable e⁄ect is
one of the main empirical ￿ndings of this paper. It con￿rms the basic economic intuition
that monetary incentives do matter for university inventive activity. In view of all the other
determinants of license income for which we control, it is striking that we can still pin down
an empirical relationship between license income and royalty shares.
The e⁄ect of faculty size in column (2) is sharply reduced when adding size-related
variables such as R&D and TLO size (the size coe¢ cient estimate is 0:63 = 1:35￿0:24￿0:48).
Nevertheless, the null that the size elasticity is unity cannot be rejected at a 0.10 signi￿cance
level.
Because TLO size and age (i.e., experience) presumably make the TLO more e⁄ective
in realizing the full potential value of the inventions, we expect positive coe¢ cients for these
two variables. We ￿nd that license revenue is positively related both to the size and age of
the TLO. Increasing the size of the TLO by 10 percent (the average TLO size is 3.1 full-time
professionals) would raise license income by 2.4 percent but this e⁄ect is not quite signi￿cant.
We also ￿nd returns to experience in TLO activity. An additional year of experience translates
into a 2.4 percent increase in license income.
23For ease of interpretation, TLO size and R&D funding are entered in the regression on a per faculty basis.
17The R&D variable includes funding from industry, government and non-pro￿t sources.
R&D funding is associated with higher license revenue with an elasticity of 0.48. Diminishing
returns to R&D set in because we are increasing R&D funding, holding faculty ￿xed. If we
increase both R&D and faculty size proportionally, we get close to constant returns to scale ￿a
10 percent increase in both variables yields a 11.1 (s.e. 0.19) percent increase in license revenue
(1:11 = 1:35 ￿ 0:24). Finally, as controls for di⁄erences in research orientation, we use the
fraction of the faculty in each of six technology ￿elds (physical sciences is the reference group).
We do ￿nd signi￿cant technology ￿eld di⁄erences (p-value = 0.41), once we have controlled for
R&D and other characteristics.
5.1 Public vs Private Universities
A number of previous studies have examined the relative performance of public and private
universities, which is of considerable policy interest. This earlier research has shown that private
universities have higher levels of ￿productivity￿ , measured in terms of scienti￿c publications
(Adams and Griliches, 1998) and various outcomes of technology transfer activity (Thursby
and Kemp, 2002; Siegel, Waldman and Link, 2003). We ask a di⁄erent question: does license
income respond to monetary incentives di⁄erently in public and private universities? Figure 3
suggests that it does: public universities have a milder response to royalty shares than private
institutions. In columns (3)-(6) of Table 5 we examine this issue in detail by splitting the
sample into public and private universities.24
We focus on speci￿cations (4) and (6) based on 66 public and 31 public and private
universities, respectively. We observe that royalty shares have a positive incentive e⁄ect on
license revenue both for private and public universities. The estimated ￿ is strongly signi￿cant
in private universities, but not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for public universities. In this
paper we use cluster standard errors which allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation structure. If we are slightly less demanding and use an AR(1) speci￿cation, we
￿nd that the coe¢ cient on royalty share for public universities is also typically signi￿cant at
the 0.05 level, or very close to it. However, the striking ￿nding is that the incentive e⁄ect
24Pooling is rejected: the test of the null hypothesis that the 19 coe¢ cients, including year dummies, in
speci￿cation (2) are the same for public and private universities has p-value = 0.01.
18is more than three times larger in private institutions than in public universities. The point
estimate implies that a ten percentage point increase in royalty share would increase license
income by 58 percent in private institutions. These results con￿rm the non-parametric ￿ndings
and show, for the ￿rst time, that the degree of faculty responsiveness to royalty incentives
depends on university ownership. Since we have controlled for a number of relevant university
characteristics, the importance of university ownership type is not driven by these di⁄erences.
The other striking ￿nding concerns the e⁄ectiveness of the TLO. The estimated elasticity
of TLO size on license income is much larger in private universities than in public ones. A 10
percent increase in the number of TLO professionals (equivalent to one-third of a full time
employee, at the sample mean of the data) raises license income in private universities by
almost 8 percent increases but has no signi￿cant e⁄ect in public universities. We also allowed
the returns to experience to vary by adding a quadratic term in age. The estimated coe¢ cient
on the quadratic is insigni￿cant for public universities but signi￿cantly negative for private
institutions (results not shown). For private universities, an additional year of experience
increases revenues by 9.4 percent when TLO age is 8 and 6.4 percent at age 16. For public
universities, the estimate is only 2.6 percent. This again suggests important di⁄erences in the
way TLOs operate: in private institutions experience gains are much larger and are realized
earlier than in public universities. Because the addition of age squared to the regression leaves
the incentive e⁄ects and other parameters essentially unchanged we use the more parsimonious
linear speci￿cation.25 Taken together, these ￿ndings on TLO size and age suggest that private
institutions have more e⁄ective, commercially-oriented technology transfer activity. We discuss
why this might be so in Section 5.3.26
25The estimates of ￿ are 1.62 (s.e. = 1.33) and 5.18 (s.e. = 2.15) in public and private universities, respectively.
26It is worth emphasising at this point that public and private universities in the sample do not di⁄er signi￿-
cantly in any of the observable characteristics that we measure, except quality (private universities are higher).
There are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in faculty size (380 and 320, p-value =0.35), TLO size (3.1 and 3.2, p-
value=0.89) and age (11.9 and 12.5, p-value=0.78), R&D funding (149 million and 164 million, p-value=0.70),
and the technological mix of the faculty (details omitted). The di⁄erence in quality between public and private
universities is captured by signi￿cant di⁄erences in our three measures of quality: the number of citations per
faculty, the number of publications per faculty and the NRC quality score. For public universities, the mean
of these indicators are 11.7, 6.8 and 2.8, respectively. For private universities, the means are 31.9, 8.6 and 3.4,
respectively. These di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant (p-values < 0.01).
The same conclusions are reached if we compare di⁄erent quartiles, or the whole distribution as con￿rmed by
univariate Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
195.2 Potential Endogeneity of Royalty Shares
There are two potential sources of endogeneity bias in the OLS estimator of ￿. The ￿rst is
simultaneity bias. One might think that universities that perform poorly in terms of generating
license income may set higher inventor royalty shares to improve performance. But this would
make our estimates of the incentive e⁄ect downward biased. An alternative possibility is that
when license income is high the university decides to make good to its faculty by increasing
their share of the royalties. This would generate an upward bias in the estimated incentive
e⁄ect. There is no compelling logic to this type of compensation, in particular when license
income is driven by just a few inventions whereas a change in the distribution scheme applies
to all inventors. In any case, we expect the simultaneity bias to be relatively small mainly
for two reasons: 1) most royalty distribution schemes for universities in our sample were set
before the start of the sample period (1991) and, in many cases, they were never changed since
the foundation of the TLO and, 2) our ￿nding that royalty shares are weakly related to key
observable university characteristics (Table 4) limits the scope to which they can be related to
other unobservables features.
The second source of bias is nonreporting bias. A researcher has a choice between
reporting (disclosing) the invention and sharing the license revenues with the university, or not
reporting it and commercializing it outside (e.g., by forming a private start-up company). If
this nonreporting error is uncorrelated with the royalty share, there is no bias in the estimated
incentive e⁄ect. But suppose the rate of misreporting decreases as the royalty share increases,
a reasonable assumption. Then when s increases, part of the observed rise in license revenue
would re￿ ect inventors now reporting previously unreported inventions, and the estimator of
￿ would be upward biased, i.e., it would overstate the incentive e⁄ect of royalty sharing on
license income.27
Interestingly, this type of bias could potentially explain part of the public-private di⁄er-
ence in ￿ if misreporting is a more serious problem at private universities. However, we are
not aware of any systematic evidence on this issue nor have any good reasons to believe this is
actually the case. If anything, our ￿nding that TLOs at public universities are less successful
27The bias is magni￿ed if the non-reported inventions are more likely to be high valued.
20in generating and capturing innovation rents than their counterparts at private universities
suggests that misreporting may be more pervasive at public universities.
With the available data we cannot identify the magnitude of this misreporting e⁄ect
but, because university faculty have a contractual obligation to report invention disclosures to
the TLO, it is unlikely that this bias is large enough to undo the estimated positive e⁄ect of
direct monetary incentives on license income. Of course, from the ￿nancial perspective of the
university, both the incentive e⁄ect and the reporting e⁄ect of royalty shares are relevant, since
they jointly determine how much license income the university actually earns.
In sum, the two likely sources of bias in our estimator of ￿ work in opposite directions
and, although they do not have to cancel each other, we have good reasons to believe that they
cannot undo the strong positive estimates of the incentive e⁄ects.28
5.3 Public vs Private Response: the Gatekeeper E⁄ect
What accounts for the di⁄erential response to royalty incentives in private and public universi-
ties? One possible, and simple, explanation for the private-public di⁄erential response is that
royalty incentives depend to a large extent on the TLO￿ s capability in commercialising faculty
inventions. Recall that control rights over inventions always reside with the university so that
the TLO e⁄ectively has exclusive rights (unless expressly waived) to commercialize the inven-
tions. Because the TLO is the ￿gatekeeper￿(monopsonist over the inventions, as it were), its
e⁄ectiveness at ￿nding licensees, negotiating agreements and other aspects of commercialising
inventions, directly a⁄ects the monetary returns to the faculty scientist. Raising the royalty
share should have a smaller e⁄ect on incentives if faculty scientists anticipate that the TLO
will be ine⁄ective at commercialising their inventions.
In this section we explore the issue further. In the model, the scientist￿ s e⁄ort can
be increased by raising the royalty rate, s; or by increasing the e⁄ectiveness of the TLO at
commercialising the inventions they produce, ￿: In fact, under fairly general conditions, the
28We performed a Hausman test for endogeneity of s by comparing the GLS estimator to the ￿xed-e⁄ect (FE)
estimator of ￿. The GLS estimator is very similar to the one reported in Table 5. The FE estimator is feasible
because in 11 universities we recorded a change in s over time but, of course, this is precisely what limits our
use of the FE estimator. In any case, the GLS and FE are similar to each other, particularly in the private
universities, and their di⁄erence is not statistically di⁄erent from zero. The t-value for the di⁄erence between
FE and GLS is -0.87 in public universities and -0.29 in private universities.
21monetary incentives depend on the interaction between these two parameters.29 In the extreme
case where ￿ = 0; the share apportioned to faculty will not matter at all. This gatekeeper e⁄ect
does not appear in the empirical speci￿cation ￿equation (5) ￿because we log-linearized the
revenue function.
This explanation for the private-public di⁄erence in responsiveness to royalty incentives
is consistent with the ￿nding in Table 5 that the elasticity of license revenues with respect to
TLO size is much larger at private universities. But this proxy for ￿ is crude. The challenge
is to identify characteristics in TLO￿ s that are systematically di⁄erent in public and private
universities and which would help explain why the latter are more e⁄ective in generating license
income. For this we developed a new survey questionnaire and sent it to directors of TLO￿ s in
both public and private universities.30 We received 101 responses, of which only 57 were in the
regression sample. Table 6 summarizes key results of this survey. First, we ￿nd that faculty are
well aware of monetary incentives associated with commercialising their inventions, and there
is no di⁄erence between public and private universities in this regard (row 1). Second, we asked
whether the university faculty reward structures (salaries and promotion) gave any signi￿cant
weight to any measures of technology transfer output. Nearly all report that technology transfer
output is not formally rewarded, and again there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between university
types.


























If the TLO licensed all inventions (H(s;￿) = 1); it is easy to show that this property holds as long as diminishing
returns in the production function n(z) and  (q) are not too strong (i.e., n
00 and  
00 are su¢ ciently small). The
conditions are more complicated when invention quality also a⁄ects the probability of being licensed. In this
case we also a condition on the distribution of invention values G(v) which requires that the density function
g(v) be declining (or not increasing ￿too much￿ ) in v: Details are available on request.
30We sent the questionnaire to TLO directors in 198 public and private universities. These cover nearly all
universities in the U.S. and Canada that are members of the AUTM, and they include both those used in the
regression analysis as well as others. After several email and telephone follow-ups, we received a total of 101
responses, of which 57 were in the regression sample. The results of this survey will be analysed more fully in
another paper.
22straints, and objectives. First, fewer than half of the TLOs in public universities use any form
of performance-based pay (either merit pay or bonuses) in the TLO itself, as compared to 79
percent in private universities (row 3 in Table 6). This di⁄erence is strongly signi￿cant. The
second dimension is the extent to which state government constrains the e⁄ectiveness of TLO
activity.31 The responses were coded on a Likert scale of 1-4 (1=very important, 2=moderately
important, 3=relatively unimportant and 4=unimportant). Here we group the responses into
two categories ￿important (1 or 2) and unimportant (3 or 4). The percentage reporting that
such constraints were important is very di⁄erent for public and private universities, for each
of the six types of constraints examined. In every case, we ￿nd that public universities report
that they are more constrained, and the di⁄erences are strongly signi￿cant (rows 4.1-4.6).
The third dimension examined is the importance of various objectives of the TLO, mea-
sured on the 1-4 Likert scale (again, we grouped responses into two categories for this test). As
rows 5.1-5.3 in Table 6 show, there is no di⁄erence in terms of the importance of the number
of licenses or license income, as objectives. However, public universities are much more likely
to rank ￿promoting local or regional economic development￿ as an important objective, as
compared to private universities, and the di⁄erence is signi￿cant.
These survey ￿ndings suggest that the TLO e⁄ectiveness in generating license income,
￿; is likely to be higher in private universities. In principle, this can help explain our ￿nding
that license revenue is more responsive to royalty incentives in private universities. Ideally, we
would want to integrate the survey data into the regression analysis, but for this we would need
more survey responses from universities included in the regression sample.
5.4 Is There a La⁄er Curve E⁄ect?
The parameter estimates from Table 5 imply that raising the inventor￿ s royalty share would
increase total license income. The point estimate of the semi-elasticity of license revenue with
respect to royalty share, ￿, implies that raising the inventor royalty share by ten percentage
points, say from the sample mean of about 45 to 55 percent, would increase license income by
31The survey question is: ￿Does the state government impose any signi￿cant constraints that the limit the
e⁄ectiveness of [your] TLO activity...either explicit forms - such as statutes, regulations, covenants of the uni-
versity charter - or implicit forms such as pressure from political representatives or agencies.￿Six speci￿c types
of constraints were listed.
2316 and 58 percent in public and private institutions, respectively.
Raising the royalty share may even increase license income accruing directly to the univer-
sity, (1 ￿ s)R: The semi-elasticity for university￿ s income is
dlog(1￿s)R
ds = ￿ ￿ 1
1￿s: When ￿ > 1
there can be a La⁄er e⁄ect for universities with su¢ ciently low royalty rates: i.e., raising the
inventor￿ s royalty share would increase the university￿ s license income when s < s￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿1.
We ￿nd such a La⁄er e⁄ect for all private universities in the sample (s￿ = 0:83), but only for
about a quarter of the public universities, those having s < s￿ = 0:38: The incentive e⁄ect
in these universities is large enough that raising the inventor￿ s royalty share actually increases
license income both for the inventor and the university.
Of course, even without a La⁄er e⁄ect, it may be desirable for a university to raise
the royalty share if it attaches weight to the license income for its faculty inventors (e.g., the
university could reduce salaries in return for higher royalty shares). To illustrate, suppose the
university￿ s objective function W is a linear function of license income plus other variables
y : W = (1 ￿ s)R(s) + ￿sR(s) + y; where ￿ < 1 is the weight the university attaches to the
faculty￿ s license income. Then @W
@s > 0 if ￿ > 1￿ ￿
1+s￿: Using ￿ = 1:62 and the mean of s = :46
for public universities, we conclude that raising the royalty share would increase university
welfare if ￿ > 0:07: A rigorous analysis of this issue would require a model of university
objectives, policy instruments and the academic labour market, which is beyond the scope of
this paper.
5.5 Incentive E⁄ects: E⁄ort or Sorting?
Despite our controls for university quality, there is likely to be unobserved heterogeneity in re-
search productivity (or commercial orientation) of faculty. Universities might attempt to attract
more productive faculty by o⁄ering higher royalty shares, even if compensated by salary reduc-
tions to keep the total compensation across faculty constant. If more productive researchers
have higher e⁄ort elasticities, they will be more responsive to incentives at the margin. If sort-
ing occurs, universities with higher royalty shares have more productive faculty who are more
responsive to monetary incentives, which is consistent with the results reported in Tables 5.32




@q: For the sorting story




@q be higher for more productive faculty, at the same (z;q). If more productive
24As we indicated in Section 3, monetary incentives are likely to work through their im-
pact on the e⁄ort levels of individual researchers and through the sorting of scientists across
universities. Assessing the relative importance of the e⁄ort and sorting channels is important
because they have very di⁄erent policy implications. However, without productivity data for
individual inventors, it is di¢ cult to distinguish e⁄ort from sorting e⁄ects.33 Here we develop
an indirect test for the presence of a sorting channel based on aggregate data.
The intuition for the test is as follows. Let si denote the royalty share of university i and
sic be the mean share for the set of universities competing with university i: Under sorting, the
type of faculty a university attracts should depend on how high its royalty share is relative to
the set of competing universities. This carries two implications. First, the presence of sorting
implies that the e⁄ect of sic on the license revenues of university i should be negative. Second,
pure sorting, i.e., when e⁄ort (z;q) is not a⁄ected by s; implies that licensing revenue should
be homogeneous of degree zero in si and sic: If university i and its competitors were all to
increase their inventor￿ s royalty shares by the same amount then the allocation of scientists
across universities will not change and, because s does not a⁄ect research e⁄orts by hypothesis,
license revenues should not change.
To test these predictions, we expand the license income regression to include sic :
logRi = ￿1si + ￿2sic + x￿ + !￿ + u (6)
Under pure sorting, we expect that ￿2 < 0 and ￿1 + ￿2 = 0: Under a pure e⁄ort model, we
should ￿nd ￿2 = 0: In both cases, we should have ￿1 > 0: When there are both sorting and
e⁄ort e⁄ects, raising the royalty shares for all universities in the same reference group should
lead to an increase in innovation and licensing due to the increased e⁄ort incentives. Thus, the
mixed sorting-e⁄ort hypothesis implies ￿1 > 0;￿2 < 0 and ￿1 + ￿2 > 0.
We assume that a scientist chooses from among ￿competing￿universities. We rank the
universities according to a relevant index and de￿ne the set of competing universities as those
faculty were not more responsive to changes in revenues, then the sorting mechanism will just a⁄ect the revenue
level (the constant of the regression) but the not the slope of the r ￿ s relationship.
33For a recent study of the e⁄ects of performance-based pay on e⁄ort and sorting, see Lazear (2000). He
analyzed the e⁄ect on workers￿productivity in a large auto glass company as it switched from hour to piece-rate
pay, and found that individual productivity increased substantially and the ￿rm attracted a more able workforce.
25close to university i in this ranking. Closeness is determined by a window of size 2k around
the ranking of university i: This means that we averaged the royalty shares of the universities
ranked up to (and including) k positions lower and higher than university i; 2k universities
altogether. In de￿ning the competing universities, we pool public and private universities,
although we estimate the model separately for the two types. We experimented with two
di⁄erent window sizes, k = 2;3:
For this test we use two alternative criteria to de￿ne competing universities: the level of
total R&D funding per faculty and the number of citations per faculty. In the new survey of
TLO directors we conducted, we asked whether ￿staying in line with competing universities￿
was an important consideration in setting royalty sharing rates and, if so, how they would
de￿ne that group. R&D funding and academic quality were the two most frequently listed
criteria.
Table 7 summarises the estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 (other parameters are omitted for brevity)
Using R&D funding per faculty (Panel A), we ￿nd clear evidence that sorting operates for pri-
vate universities. For each window size, the coe¢ cient on the royalty share for the competitor￿ s
group, ￿2, is negative and statistically signi￿cant. Because of the large standard errors of b ￿2 the
point estimate of ￿1 +￿2 is actually quite close to zero, and we cannot formally reject the zero
homogeneity hypothesis, ￿1 + ￿2 = 0: Given the associated standard error, we also would not
reject the hypothesis that ￿1+￿2 is positive. For public universities, we ￿nd no evidence of any
sorting e⁄ect, but nor do we ￿nd any direct incentive e⁄ect either. When we use citations per
faculty to identify competing universities (Panel B), the point estimates again indicate sorting
behaviour for private universities, but the parameter estimates are not statistically signi￿cant.
In short, the evidence indicates that the e⁄ect of royalty shares on licensing revenues in
private universities works both through e⁄ort and sorting channels, but we cannot pin down
their relative importance of these channels with the available university-level data.
5.6 Incentive E⁄ects on Invention Quantity and Quality
License revenue per faculty depends both on the number of inventions and their value. It
is natural to ask wether one can distinguish between the quantity (n) and the quality (v)
components of the royalty share e⁄ect on license revenue. It turns out that the available
26aggregate data allow us to address this question.





"dG("): Substituting into the revenues equation (3) gives
R = ￿v0 (q(s;￿))L (7)
If the royalty share s has an e⁄ect on the quality of inventions, then this equation says
that s should have an e⁄ect on license revenues even after we control for the number of licenses.
If we do not observe this, then we can conclude that the incentive e⁄ects of royalty sharing
work only through the quantity of inventions, but not their quality. The elasticity of revenues
with respect to licenses should be one.
Table 8 presents results of estimating equation (7) using a log approximation and the
cumulative number of active licenses. Data on the latter are available only since 1995, so for
purposes of comparison, the baseline regressions are shown in columns (1) and (5) for the same
period 1995-99. Notice that these estimates are very similar to those in Table 5 using the full
sample. We ￿nd that controlling for L reduces the estimated e⁄ect of royalty shares on revenues
but it does not eliminate it completely.34 This is particularly true in private universities, but
less so in public ones where the incentive e⁄ect was not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero even
when L was not controlled for. The estimates imply that increasing the royalty share at private
universities by 10 percentage points will generate 38 percent more license revenue, given the
same number of licenses. Because the total e⁄ect of such a change in royalty shares on license
revenues is much higher ￿about 58 percent (Table 5) ￿it follows that the number of inventions
is also a⁄ected by the royalty share.
Actually, we can gauge the e⁄ect of s on the quantity of inventions directly by regressing
the available proxies for the number of inventions on s and the other controls. We use two
imperfect measures of inventions: the number of licenses executed and the number of invention
disclosures, both of them ￿ ow measures. These quantity regressions are presented in columns
34As expected, the coe¢ cient on logL is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one. Also notice that faculty size does
not appear in equation (7) once L is included. Adding F to the regressions in columns (2) and (6) does not
a⁄ect the results at all. For example, adding log F to column (2) reduces the license coe¢ cient from 0.77 to
0.64 (0.19) and increases the coe¢ cient on royalty share from 1.20 to 1.51 (1.55). Adding log F to column (6)
reduces the license coe¢ cient from 0.77 to 0.76 (0.31) and increases the coe¢ cient on royalty share from 3.83 to
3.94 (1.89).
27(3)￿ (4) and (7)￿ (8).35 There is no real evidence that royalty incentives have any e⁄ect on
the number of inventions in public universities. The other controls have the expected signs.
Notice, in particular, the signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of the TLO. In private universities, we ￿nd
a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of s on the number of licenses executed but no e⁄ect on the
number of disclosures. Increasing the royalty share at private universities by 10 percentage
points will generate 26 percent more licenses. Added to the 38 percent increase in the mean
value of licensed inventions (column (6)), this gives a predicted e⁄ect on license income of
64 percent, which is very close to the 58 percent e⁄ect found in Table 5, even though the
regressions are based on di⁄erent cuts of the data. The main implication of this analysis is
that the quality channel is more important than the quantity channel in private universities.
In public universities, however, s has a an overall very weak e⁄ect because neither quantity nor
quality seems to be a⁄ected by royalty incentives.
The use of quantity measures in these regression may introduce measurement error be-
cause of the possibility that faculty do not report all their inventions to the TLO. We now show
that this is likely to bias the e⁄ect of royalty shares upward in the quantity regression, and
downward in the revenue regression. Let N￿ be the true number of disclosures at the university
and let N be the observed number (nF in the model). Assume
N = N￿ (1 ￿ ￿) 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
where ￿ is the rate of misreporting. When ￿ = 0 faculty reports all inventions to the TLO.
Similarly, the true and observed number of licenses are
L￿ = N￿H(s)






In the license income regression, when logL is used instead of logL￿ as a regressor in
columns (2) and (6), it adds ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) to the error in the regression. If ￿ and s are not
correlated then there is no bias. However, if Cov(￿;s) < 0, i.e., misreporting decreases as the
inventor￿ s royalty share increases, then s and -log(1￿￿) are negatively correlated and we get a
35Disclosure data are available for all years, but the number of licenses executed are available only for 1991-96.
28downward bias in the estimated coe¢ cient of s in the regressions in columns (2) and (6). The
coe¢ cient of logL would also be biased downward.
In the quantity regressions, using logN or logL as dependent variable instead of logN￿
or logL￿ adds log(1 ￿ ￿) to the error in the regression. If Cov(￿;s) < 0; then s and log(1 ￿ ￿)
are positively correlated and there is an upward bias in the estimated coe¢ cient of s in the
quantity equation. That is, part of the observed rise in the number of inventions, associated
with an increase in s; is due to the reporting of previously unreported invention rather than to
new inventions. Thus the point estimate of the incentive e⁄ect on the quantity of inventions in
private universities may overstate its true e⁄ect.
The direction of the possible biases in both the income and the number of licenses regres-
sions reinforce our conclusion that the incentive e⁄ect of royalty sharing works predominantly
through the quality channel.
6 Robustness Checks
In this section we discuss a variety of extensions to the baseline speci￿cation in Table 5, es-
timated separately for public and private universities. We focus on the robustness of the
estimated incentive e⁄ect of inventor royalty shares, but there is also independent interest in
some of the speci￿cations we examine.
First, we check robustness of the parameter estimates to "outliers." As pointed out in
Section 2, the distribution of license income is highly skewed across universities. This raises
a concern that our empirical results may be driven by a few outliers in the sample in terms
of the dependent variable. We address this issue in two di⁄erent ways: (1) we re-estimate the
model dropping the top license income earners, and (2) we estimate the model using median
regression (this procedure minimizes the sum of absolute deviations and thus gives less weight to
outliers). Table 9 presents the results. For the ￿rst experiment, we drop three universities from
the sample: the University of California System in the public university sample, and Stanford
and Columbia Universities in the private sample. These were the top earners over the sample
period and their license income was an order of magnitude higher than other universities. For
private universities, the estimated coe¢ cients on the royalty share are slightly lower than the
least squares estimates in Table 5, but still very large and signi￿cant. Dropping California
29does not a⁄ect the estimated ￿ in public universities, but using the median regression cuts the
estimate in half. The elasticity of TLO size in public universities is also increased considerably
when median regression is used. Overall, the ￿nding of a strong incentive e⁄ect in private
universities and of a much weaker e⁄ect in public universities is not a⁄ected by the presence
or absence of the top license earners.36
Second, we introduced dummy variables to capture the Carnegie Foundation research
classi￿cation of universities (doctoral/research universities, master￿ s colleges and universities,
etc.). The coe¢ cients are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero and do not a⁄ect the estimated
incentive e⁄ects or other coe¢ cients (results not reported). The estimated ￿ is 1.53 (1.36) and
5.78 (2.15) in public and private universities, respectively. The same conclusions hold when we
introduce a dummy for the presence of a medical school at the university.37
Third, we re-estimate the model using alternative measures of quality: the number of
publications per faculty, the NRC scholarly quality score and the average faculty salary at the
university (Table 10). All the alternative measures a⁄ect revenues in a positive way at private
universities. Also, the point estimates of the incentive e⁄ect, although marginally lower than
in the baseline speci￿cation, where citations per faculty are used (Table 5), remain quite high.
None of the quality measures a⁄ects license revenues in public universities either individually
or jointly. Nor is the estimated e⁄ect of royalty shares a⁄ected by the use of a particular quality
proxy. The remaining parameters estimates are also robust to the choice of quality proxy, both
for public and private universities.
Fourth, we allow for the possibility that the incentive e⁄ect of royalty shares varies with
two characteristics of the university: quality and the percentage of faculty which is tenured.
Turning ￿rst to quality, it is commonly argued that faculty at more prestigious institutions
are likely to be motivated mainly by scienti￿c recognition and status rather than by monetary
rewards. In the model this takes the form of a lower marginal utility of license revenue in
36The standard errors of the median regression are not robust standard errors. We also estimated quantile
regressions for the ￿rst and third quartiles. In public universities, the estimated ￿
0s are 0.15 (.11) and 1.20
(0.75), respectively. In private universities, the estimates are 3.9 (1.4) and 5.3 (1.9), respectively.
37The medical dummy is not signi￿cant in public universities and marginally signi￿cant in private ones with
a positive coe¢ cient equal to 1.4 (0.78). The estimated ￿ is 1.62 (1.32) and 6.69 (2.11) in public and private
universities, respectively. The same conclusions holds if we use the medical school dummy instead of the
technology ￿elds shares.
30higher quality universities. To test this, we include interactions terms between the inventor
royalty share and dummy variables for the lowest and highest quartile of the citations per
faculty distribution (Columns 1 and 3, Table 11). In support of the popular view, we ￿nd that
the incentive e⁄ects of royalty shares declines with university quality. In public universities the
estimated coe¢ cient declines from 3.4 (s.e.=1.8) in the ￿rst quartile of the quality distribution
to 1.6 (s.e.=1.02) in the fourth quartile. In private universities, we ￿nd the same pattern: b ￿ is
6.6 (s.e.=1.63) in the ￿rst quartile and declines to 4.8 (s.e.=2.25) in the fourth quartile.
Turning to faculty tenure, if doing research that produces commercially usable inventions
comes at the cost of doing less (quality-adjusted) academic publications, then one would expect
untenured faculty members to be less responsive to royalty shares than tenured members. To
test this, we include interactions terms between the inventor royalty share and dummy variables
for the lowest and highest quartile of the tenure distribution (the percentage of tenured faculty
at each university). As columns 2 and 4 (Table 11) show, the hypothesis is con￿rmed for
public universities. The incentive e⁄ect of royalty shares is signi￿cant and positive in the top
quartile of the tenure distribution, but not in the lower three quartiles. This is particularly
interesting, since the baseline estimate of the incentive e⁄ect for public universities was not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (Table 5). For private universities, there is no support for the
hypothesis, but the estimated incentive e⁄ects are again much larger than for public universities
and statistically signi￿cant.
In Table 12 we allow industry and publicly-funded R&D to have di⁄erent e⁄ects on
licensing income. Publicly-funded R&D has a positive e⁄ect on license revenue, but it is
signi￿cant only in public universities. The point estimates of the elasticities imply that raising
public R&D by 10 percent would increase license revenue by about 4 percent.38 By contrast,
we ￿nd that industry-￿nanced R&D has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on license income. This is what
one would expect if the bulk of such funding is contract R&D with free licensing provisions
(i.e., ex ante R&D funds are given in place of ex post licensing income). One could even argue
that industry-￿nanced R&D may reduce the average license income received by the university
38Payne and Siow (2003) analyze the e⁄ect of federal funding on university research. Using a sample of 68
research universities, they conclude that increasing federal research funding results in more, but not necessarily
higher quality, research output.
31because the ￿rms are likely to get more favorable licensing arrangements. Importantly, the
estimated coe¢ cients on the royalty shares, and on the other regressors, are nearly identical to
the baseline case.
Finally, we added a variable to control for di⁄erences in the potential demand for licenses
by private ￿rms. If demand for licensing is localized, because of information or other factors,
universities located in more dense high-tech areas should license more inventions from a given
pool of invention disclosures and obtain more revenue. Moreover, faculty response to incentives
may depend on local demand factors. A more developed local high-tech market may increase
faculty awareness of the potential rewards to university inventions. On the other hand, it
may also increase the demand for faculty consultants, advisors, and other type of scienti￿c
endeavours that compete with university research time making university monetary incentives
less relevant.
To address this issue, we use the 1995 Milken index of high-tech activity for the area
where the university is located (Friedman and Silberman, 2003).39 The index is a continuous
variables ranging from zero to a maximum of 23.7 (for Stanford University) but we discretized
it by grouping universities into three groups: universities in the ￿rst quartile of the Milken
index distribution, universities in the second and third quartiles and universities in the fourth
quartile. Royalty shares do not vary much with the Milken index of high-tech activity: the
average s at universities in the three groups is 42, 47 and 43 percent, respectively. This suggests
that royalty shares are not set in response to the value of outside options available locally to
university scientists. Table 13 shows the results of the baseline models with dummies for the
￿rst and fourth quartile and their interaction with s:
The local demand argument implies that the coe¢ cients of the dummies representing
each of the three groups should be increasing as we move from the ￿rst to the fourth quartile.
We ￿nd a strong local, high-tech demand e⁄ect for private universities but not public ones.
License revenues in private universities located in the most dense high-tech areas are over
300 percent higher than comparable universities in less high-tech surroundings (we reject that
the coe¢ cients on the dummies are jointly zero, p-value < 0:01). But license revenues in
39Nine observations are dropped because the index is not available.
32public universities do not vary with the index of local demand (the coe¢ cients on the two
dummies are not di⁄erent from zero, p-value = 0.86). This ￿nding again suggests that private
universities are more e⁄ective than public ones to exploit the potential of being located in high-
tech areas. But the fact that local demand conditions matter at all indicates the importance of
structuring technology transfer institutions so that they can more e⁄ectively exploit demand
for inventions in non-local areas. For this purpose, specialization of TLO￿ s by university (the
current arrangement) may be inferior to alternatives such as having TLO￿ s that specialize by
technology area and serve multiple universities.
The responsiveness to monetary incentives again di⁄ers by ownership type. In public
universities, the royalty e⁄ect does not vary much with the index of local demand (we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the interaction terms are zero, p-value = 0.88). In private universities,
however, the responsiveness to the inventor￿ s royalty share exhibits a clear pattern: b ￿ decreases
sharply from about 12 at universities located in low high-tech areas to about 4 at universities
in the fourth quartile (the p-value for the test that the interaction coe¢ cients are zero is
0.08). Though speculative, this ￿nding is consistent with the argument that a concentration of
high-tech ￿rms may lure faculty away into consultancy jobs and lower their responsiveness to
university incentives.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we exploit cross-university variation in the share of licensing royalties received by
academic scientists in order to estimate the e⁄ect of monetary incentives on inventive output,
as measured by the license income generated by the inventions.
We report two main results. First, we show that academic research and inventive activ-
ity in universities respond to variations in inventors￿royalty shares. Controlling for a variety
of other determinants, including university size, quality, R&D funding and local demand con-
ditions, we ￿nd that universities with higher royalty shares generate higher levels of license
income. This ￿nding is important because it implies that the design of intellectual property
rights, and other forms of incentives, in academic institutions can have real e⁄ects. We also
explore whether the incentive e⁄ects of royalty sharing work by inducing greater e⁄ort by sci-
entists or through sorting of scientists across universities. We ￿nd evidence of sorting e⁄ects,
33but we cannot pin down the relative contribution of e⁄ort and sorting with the available data.
We also show that these incentive e⁄ects work primarily by increasing the quality, rather than
the quantity, of inventions.
Second, we show that the response to incentives, and the e⁄ectiveness of technology
licensing o¢ ces, are much larger and more signi￿cant in private universities than in public ones.
In order to rationalise this sharp di⁄erence, we argue that there is a "gatekeeper e⁄ect": because
TLOs in public universities are less e⁄ective at commercialising inventions, the incentive e⁄ect
of higher royalty shares is muted. We provide survey evidence that the use of incentives, the
constraints and the objectives of TLOs in public and private universities di⁄er in ways that are
consistent with this claim. Finally, in private universities the incentive e⁄ect is strong enough
to produce a La⁄er e⁄ect, where raising the inventor￿ s royalty share would increase the license
revenue actually retained by the university.
There are three main directions for further research. The ￿rst is to combine the data in
this paper with information on the objectives, internal incentives and organisational structure
of technology licensing o¢ ces, in order to understand why private universities perform so much
better than public ones in technology transfer. The second avenue is to examine university-
level data (and other public research organisations) for other OECD countries in which there
is variation both in cash ￿ ow and control rights. The third, and most ambitious, avenue is to
model university behavior and the academic labour market, incorporating pecuniary incentives
(salaries and royalties), multi-tasking and career concerns. To do this will require a suitable
speci￿cation of the objectives and decision-making rules of the university. Such a model could
be used as the basis for more detailed studies of incentives and university research using micro-
data on academic scientists.
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37Table 1. Descriptive Statistics1
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75%
1. Licensing income (￿ 000s)2 102 3,351.6 8,103.8 162.3 620.1 2,942
2. Licensing income (￿ 000s) per license2;3 96 48.2 162.8 9.5 17.3 39.4
3. No. of invention disclosures 102 66.9 81.0 19.5 44.7 81.1
4. No. of invention disclosures per faculty 102 0.22 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.26
5. Faculty Size 102 360 369 136 288 494
6. Citations per faculty4 102 18.5 22.7 5.1 11.7 21.2
7. Publications per faculty4 102 7.4 3.0 5.2 7.1 9.7
8. Scholarly quality (0-5) 102 3.0 0.8 2.5 3.1 3.6
9. Average size of TLO5 102 3.1 5.2 1.0 2.0 3.3
10. Age of TLO in 1999 (years) 99 16.0 12.6 8.0 13.0 17.0
Notes:
1 Statistics computed on the time-averaged data for each of the N universities.
2 Income data in nominal dollars.
3 Licensing income in year t divided by the cumulative number of active licenses through year t.
4 During 1988-92.
5 Number of full time professionals employed by the TLO.
38Table 2. Distribution of Inventor Royalty Shares (percent)
1
Mean 25% 50% 75% Min Max
Linear Schedules (No. universities=58) 41 33 40 50 21 65
Nonlinear Schedules: Expected Royalty Share2 51 42 49 49 20 97
(No. universities=44)
Income Interval:
0-10,000 53 43 50 50 20 100
10,000-50,000 45 40 50 50 20 93
50,000-100,000 42 33 44 50 20 85
100,000-300,000 35 29 33 40 20 85
300,000-500,000 33 25 30 40 20 85
500,000-1 million 32 25 30 35 20 85
Over 1 million 30 25 30 34 15 85
Notes:
1Using time-averaged royalty shares for the 11 universities that changed their shares during 1991-99.
2 See text for details.
39Table 3. Inventor Royalty Shares (percent)
by University Characteristics1
Faculty Size Citations per Faculty TLO Size per Faculty
1st quartile 50 48 44
2nd quartile 43 43 48
3rd quartile 44 46 46
4th quartile 43 44 43
F-test 1.67 0.74 0.55
(p-value) (0.18) (0.53) (0.65)
Notes:
1 Using time-averaged data for the 102 universities.
40Table 4. Determinants of Expected Royalty Shares
dependent variable: expected royalty share (s ￿ 100)
Constant 46.1￿￿ 54.7￿￿ 56.1￿￿ 60.1￿￿
(7.28) (13.3) (15.2) (18.2)
Faculty size -0.006 -0.005 -0.022￿ -0.021
(.009) (.009) (.012) (.014)
Citations/faculty -0.15 -0.15 -0.24￿￿ -0.19
(.10) (0.10) (.10) (.13)
Publications/faculty 0.58 0.96 -1.16 0.87
(1.00) (1.11) (1.13) (1.25)
Quality index -0.11 -2.79 -0.11 2.02
(4.82) (4.48) (4.65) (5.30)
Biomedical ￿ -0.03 -6.11 -2.39
(11.6) (13.7) (15.6)
Other Biological ￿ -6.63 -9.98 -8.15
(11.5) (13.3) (14.9)
Computer Science ￿ 53.0 35.3 39.8
(54.0) (50.8) (58.4)
Chemical Science ￿ -18.2 -22.8 -19.4
(15.7) (14.8) (15.6)
Engineering ￿ -14.1 -13.7 -9.50
(15.8) (17.5) (21.3)
TLO size ￿ ￿ 1.56 1.45
(1.09) (1.14)
TLO age ￿ ￿ -0.38￿￿ -0.41￿￿
(0.13) (0.13)
R&D (millions) ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.004
(.030)
Private University ￿ ￿ ￿ -1.92
(3.15)
Average Salary (￿ 000s) -0.25
(.32)
R2 0.05 0.12 0.24 0.26
Test for zero coe¢ cients
p-value 0.251 0.314 0.010 0.003
No. obs. 102 102 99 97
Notes:
Using time-averaged data for the 102 universities, when available.
In parenthesis, heteroskedasticty-robust standard errors using
the HC3 ￿nite-sample correction (Davidson and MacKinnon, p. 554).
￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level
￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
41Table 5. Parameter Estimates for Licensing Revenues [eq.(5)]
All Universities Private Universities Public Universities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Royalty share 1.85 1.91￿￿ 4.09￿￿ 5.82￿￿ 0.80 1.62
(1.09) (.96) (1.04) (2.11) (1.35) (1.34)
Log faculty size 1.22￿￿ 1.35￿￿ 0.91￿￿ 1.59￿￿ 1.36￿￿ 1.41￿￿
(.144) (.142) (.261) (.277) (.140) (.166)
Citations/faculty 0.023￿￿ 0.015￿￿ 0.025￿￿ 0.018￿￿ 0.018 0.007
(.005) (.004) (.006) (.005) (.013) (.014)
Log (R&D/faculty) ￿ 0.480￿￿ ￿ 0.36 ￿ 0.48￿￿
(.225) (.329) (.203)
Log (TLO/faculty) ￿ 0.243 ￿ 0.774￿￿ ￿ -0.009
(.162) (.317) (.159)
Age TLO ￿ 0.024￿￿ ￿ 0.010 ￿ 0.026￿￿
(.009) (.016) (.010)
Biomedical ￿ 0.82 ￿ 0.55 ￿ 1.17
(1.14) (2.33) (1.41)
Other Biological ￿ 0.06 ￿ 1.60 ￿ -0.89
(1.09) (2.53) (1.36)
Computer Science ￿ 2.88 ￿ -4.00 ￿ 2.85
(2.85) (8.06) (2.57)
Chemical Science ￿ 0.39 ￿ 4.10 ￿ 0.66
(1.35) (6.45) (1.54)
Engineering ￿ 1.53 ￿ 3.47 ￿ 0.97
(1.28) (2.50) (1.52)
R2 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.69 0.52 0.61
No. obs. 731 717 250 246 481 471
No. Universities 98 97 32 31 66 66
Notes:
Standard errors clustered by university in parentheses. Year dummies included in all regressions.
￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level, ￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
42Table 6. Incentives, Constraints and Objectives in Public and Private TLO￿ s1
Public Private P-value of Equality
Universities Universities of Means Test
1. Faculty Awareness of Incentives
% responding YES 91.7 96.4 0.41
2. University Rewards Technology Transfer
% responding YES 9.4 15.4 0.42
3. Incentive-pay
% using incentive pay2 49 79 0.007
4. Government constraints on:
% reporting important
4.1. Choice of license partners 23 0 <.001
4.2. Setting license contract terms 19 0 <.001
4.3.License con￿dentiality 27 0 <.001
4.4 Use of equity stakes 23 3.5 0.024
4.5 University liability/indemni￿cation 75 18 5.02
4.6. Dispute resolution mechanisms 49 3.6 3.80
5. Objectives
% reporting important
5.1 Number of licenses 97 100 0.38
5 2. License income 88 93 0.44
5.3 Promoting local/regional development 88 57 0.001
Notes:
1Based on survey data. Numbers of public and private universities are 73 and 28, respectively.
2Merit pay and/or bonuses
43Table 7. Tests of E⁄ort and Sorting [eq.(6)]
Public Universities Private Universities
k = 2 k = 3 k = 2 k = 3
Panel A
Own royalty share (￿1) 1.87 1.65 5.47￿￿ 5.10￿￿
(1.28) (1.34) (2.05) (2.04)
Competitors￿royalty share (￿2) 2.25 0.38 -4.55￿￿ -5.67￿￿
(3.20) (4.0) (1.70) (2.36)
￿1+￿2 4.11 2.04 0.92 -0.57
(3.27) (4.36) (2.18) (3.25)
R2 0.61 0.61 0.71 0.71
No. obs 471 471 246 246
No. Universities 66 66 31 31
Panel B
Own royalty share (￿1) 1.59 1.39 5.96￿￿ 5.84￿￿
(1.39) (1.43) (2.09) (2.14)
Competitors￿royalty share (￿2) -0.58 -2.27 -3.46 -0.96
(2.24) (2.94) (4.61) (3.15)
￿1+￿2 1.01 -0.88 2.51 4.88
(2.98) (3.64) (4.20) (3.18)
R2 0.61 0.61 0.70 0.69
No. obs 471 471 246 246
No. Universities 66 66 31 31
Notes:
Standard errors clustered by university in parentheses. All other control variables appearing
in Table 5 included in all regressions but are not reported.
In Panel A competing universities identi￿ed by R&D funding per faculty.
In Panel B competing universities identi￿ed by citations per faculty.
￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level, ￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
44Table 8. Incentive E⁄ect on Invention: Quantity vs Quality [eq.(7)]
Public Universities Private Universities
Dep. variable1 Revenues Licenses Disclosures Revenues Licenses Disclosures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (licenses) ￿ 0.77￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.77￿￿ ￿ ￿
(.20) (.32)
Royalty share 1.65 1.20 0.08 -0.32 5.91￿￿ 3.83￿￿ 2.60￿￿ 0.52
(1.53) (1.55) (.39) (.24) (2.22) (1.73) (.96) (1.06)
Log faculty size 1.36￿￿ ￿ 0.90￿￿ 0.94￿￿ 1.68￿￿ ￿ 1.20 0.85￿
(.19) (.096) (.046) (.26) (.21) (.16)
Citations/faculty 0.001 -0.008 0.002 0.008￿￿ 0.013￿￿ 0.007 0.007￿￿ 0.006






0.53￿￿ 0.58￿￿ 0.31￿￿ 0.38￿￿ 0.34 0.11 0.31￿￿ 0.48￿￿






-0.003 -0.11 0.19￿￿ 0.26￿￿ 1.11￿￿ 0.68￿￿ 0.65￿￿ 0.23￿
(.19) (.20) (.094) (.047) (.31) (.29) (.14) (.12)
Age TLO 0.024￿￿ 0.006 0.012￿￿ 0.006￿￿ 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.004
(.011) (.011) (.005) (.003) (.017) (.012) (.008) (.007)
R2 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.84 0.69 0.74 0.73 0.73
No. obs 270 270 305 480 137 137 165 250
No. Universities 65 65 65 67 30 30 31 32
Notes:
1 Dependent variables always in logs.
2 In columns (2) and (6), regressor is not normalized by faculty size
Standard errors clustered by university in parentheses.
Technological ￿elds and year dummies included in all regressions but are not reported.
￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level, ￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
45Table 9. Controlling for Outliers, [eq.(5)]
Private Universities Public Universities
w/o Columbia & Median w/o California Median
Stanford Regression Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Royalty share 4.72￿￿ 5.03￿￿ 1.61 0.83
(1.92) (.81) (1.35) (0.48)
Log faculty size 1.40￿￿ 1.50￿￿ 1.39￿￿ 1.49￿￿
(.24) (.11) (.19) (.083)
Citations/faculty 0.015￿￿ 0.018￿￿ 0.008 0.025￿￿
(.006) (.003) (.014) (.007)
Log (R&D/faculty) 0.46 0.127 0.48￿￿ 0.42￿￿
(.33) (.13) (.20) (.12)
Log (TLO/faculty) 0.56￿ 0.831￿￿ -0.020 0.153￿
(.30) (.11) (.17) (.091)
Age TLO 0.017 0.007 0.025￿￿ 0.026￿￿
(.013) (.008) (.010) (.005)
R2 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.40
No. obs. 228 246 462 471
No. Universities 29 31 65 66
Notes:
Standard errors clustered by university in parentheses in the OLS regressions (1) and (3).
Non-robust standard errors in the median regressions (2) and (4).
Technological ￿elds and year dummies included in all regressions but are not reported.
￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level, ￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
46Table 10. Alternative Quality Measures [eq.(5)]
Private Universities Public Universities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Royalty share 4.69￿￿ 3.76 3.84￿￿ 4.68￿￿ 1.67 1.67 1.75 1.65
(2.10) (2.10) (1.93) (2.24) (1.33) (1.33) (1.34) (1.37)
Log faculty size 1.19￿￿ 0.99￿￿ 1.03￿￿ 1.07￿ 1.40￿￿ 1.45￿￿ 1.37￿￿ 1.52￿￿
(.36) (.42) (.37) (.56) (.18) (.23) (.17) (.27)
Publications/faculty 0.19￿￿ ￿ ￿ -0.032 0.006 ￿ ￿ -0.037
(.069) (.12) (.068) (.11)
NRC quality score ￿ 1.05￿￿ ￿ 0.57 ￿ -0.068 ￿ -0.174
(.41) (.66) (.35) (.45)
Log (Average Salary) ￿ ￿ 4.95￿￿ 1.91 ￿ ￿ 0.55 0.51
(1.75) (2.28) (1.33) (1.33)
Citations per faculty ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.011 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0.016
(0.010) (.022)
Log (R&D/faculty) 0.32 0.49 0.14 0.13 0.51￿￿ 0.54￿￿ 0.49￿￿ 0.53￿￿
(.35) (.33) (.27) (.24) (.20) (.25) (.20) (.27)
Log (TLO/faculty) 0.89￿￿ 0.82￿￿ 0.83￿￿ 0.77￿￿ -0.010 -0.007 -0.027 -0.015
(.32) (.34) (.33) (.32) (.16) (.16) (.16) (.16)
Age TLO 0.014 0.002 0.019 0.007 0.026￿￿ 0.026￿￿ 0.026￿￿ 0.026￿￿
(.019) (.019) (0.021) (.018) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)
F- test for quality e⁄ects
p-value <0.001 0.91
R2 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
No. obs. 246 246 245 245 471 471 471 471
No. Universities 31 31 30 30 66 66 66 66
Notes:
Standard errors clustered by university in parentheses. Missing wage data for one private university
appearing in one year only. Technological ￿elds and year dummies included in all regressions but are not
reported. ￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level, ￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
47Table 11. Quality and Tenure Interactions with Incentive E⁄ects [eq.(5)]
Public Universities Private Universities
Royalty share interacted with:
Quality Tenure Quality Tenure
quartiles quartiles quartiles quartiles
Royalty share 1.30 1.08 3.46 4.46￿￿
(2nd & 3rd quartiles) (1.03) (1.21) (2.05) (1.68)
Royalty share ￿ 2.10￿ 0.60 3.17￿￿ 1.78￿￿
1st quartile dummy (1.10) (.91) (1.28) (.76)
Royalty share ￿ 0.30 1.46￿￿ 1.31 -0.517
4st quartile dummy (.89) (.75) (.86) (1.05)
Log faculty size 1.53￿￿ 1.44￿￿ 1.74￿￿ 1.51￿￿
(.17) (.18) (.27) (.22)
Citations/faculty 0.028 0.003 0.018￿￿ 0.017￿￿
(.024) (.015) (.005) (.007)
Log (R&D/faculty) 0.38￿ 0.55￿￿ 0.19 0.27
(.21) (.20) (.33) (.37)
Log (TLO/faculty) 0.006 0.007 .50 0.54￿￿
(.16) (.16) (.32) (.26)
Age TLO 0.028￿￿ 0.025￿￿ 0.014 0.018
(.010) (.009) (.020) (.017)
R2 0.63 0.63 0.73 0.73
No. obs 471 471 246 246
No. Universities 66 66 31 31
Notes:
Standard errors clustered by university in parentheses.
Technological ￿elds and year dummies included in all regressions but are not reported.
￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level, ￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
48Table 12. R&D by Source: Industry and Government [eq.(5)]
Public Universities Private Universities
Royalty share 1.65 5.83￿￿
(1.32) (2.16)




Log (public R&D/faculty) 0.45￿￿ 0.38
(.21) (.32)
Log (private R&D/faculty) -0.052 -0.046
(.14) (.19)
Log (TLO/faculty) -0.009 .789￿￿
(.16) (.31)
Age TLO 0.022￿￿ 0.011
(.010) (.017)
F-test for equal R&D e⁄ects
p-value 0.094 0.325
R2 0.61 0.70
No. obs 461 246
No. Universities 66 31
Notes:
Standard errors clustered by university in parentheses.
Technological ￿elds and year dummies included in all regressions but are not reported.
￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level, ￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
49Table 13. Demand Control: High-Tech Activity [eq.(5)]
Public Universities Private Universities
1st quartile dummy 0.50 -0.085
(1.32) (1.96)
4st quartile dummy -0.089 3.11￿￿
(1.20) (1.06)
Royalty share (in 2nd & 3rd quartiles) 2.10 10.32￿￿
(2.31) (1.76)
Royalty share￿1st quartile dummy -0.096 1.63
(2.93) (3.81)
Royalty share￿4st quartile dummy 0.78 -6.57￿￿
(2.28) (2.92)




Log (R&D/faculty) 0.55￿￿ 0.46
(.24) (.29)
Log (TLO/faculty) -0.061 .85￿￿
(.16) (.29)
Age TLO 0.028￿￿ 0.003
(.011) (.019)
R2 0.62 0.72
No. obs 462 246
No. Universities 65 31
Notes:
Standard errors clustered by university in parentheses.
Technological ￿elds and year dummies included in all regressions but are not reported.
￿ Signi￿cant at the 5 % level, ￿￿ Signi￿cant at the 1 % level
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52Appendix
A Description of the Data
A.1 Variable De￿nitions
Data from AUTM Licensing Surveys 1991-99.
1. Licensing income includes license issue fees, payments under options, annual minimums,
running royalties, termination payments, the amount of equity received when cashed-in,
and software and biological material end-user license fees equal to $1,000 or more. License
income includes net transfers of license income from other institutions.
2. TLO Size is the number of person(s) employed in the TLO whose duties are speci￿cally
involved with the licensing and patenting processes in either full or fractional allocation.
Licensing examples include licensee solicitation, technology valuation, marketing of tech-
nology, license agreement drafting and negotiation, and start-up activity e⁄orts. Because
this information is not available for 1991, we used the data for 1992 to measure size in
1991. The change in the point estimates is minimal but their precision increases due to
the larger number of observations.
3. TLO Age is measured using the year when then TLO was established as reported by
the AUTM surveys. When the foundation year was on 1991 or later we recoded the
foundation year to be the ￿rst year when the TLO size was larger than 0.5￿ one half
full-time equivalent professional employed.
4. R&D funding includes the total amount of research support committed to the university
(even if the funds are to be spent over several years) that was related to license/options
agreements.
Data from the 1993 National Survey of Graduate Faculty
The Survey provides data on doctoral programs that participated in the 1993 National
Research Council (NRC) National Survey of Graduate Faculty (appendix K on engineering
programs, appendix L on life science programs, and appendix N on biological sciences).
531. Science Fields: 23 doctoral programs were aggregated into 6 science ￿elds. We used
the shares of faculty employed in each ￿eld to proxy for the research orientation of the
university. The ￿elds are:
(a) Biomedical and Genetics - biochemical/molecular biology, cell and development bi-
ology, biomedical engineering and molecular and general genetics
(b) Other Biological Sciences - neurosciences, pharmacology, physiology and ecology/evolution
and behavior
(c) Computer Science includes only the department of computer sciences
(d) Chemical Science - chemistry and chemical engineering
(e) Engineering - aerospace, civil engineering, electrical engineering, industrial engineer-
ing, material science, and mechanical engineering
(f) Physical Sciences - astrophysics/astronomy, geosciences, mathematics, oceanogra-
phy, physics, and statistics/biomedical statistics.
2. Faculty Size is the total number of faculty in the 23 doctoral programs as reported in the
Survey.
3. Quality measures:
(a) Citations per faculty: ratio of total number of program citations in the period 1988-
92 to the number of program faculty. Aggregated to the university level using faculty
weights.
(b) Publications per faculty: ratio of total number of program publications in the period
1988-92 to the number of program faculty. Aggregated to the university level using
faculty weights.
(c) Scholarly quality index of program faculty is the trimmed mean of the responses
received in the Survey for each doctoral program. Scores were converted to a scale
of 0 to 5, with 0 denoting ￿Not su¢ cient for doctoral education￿and 5 denoting ￿ve
￿Distinguished￿ . Aggregated to the university level using faculty weights.
54In some instances, a university appears more than once in the NRC ￿le because the
NRC has information on two or even three units of the same department, e.g., statistics and
biostatistics or meteorology and geology (in geosciences). In these instances we averaged their
quality measures weighting each unit by its share in the total faculty number of both units
combined. In other instances, a university appears more than once in the NRC ￿le because
the NRC has information on two or more campuses (e.g., California, Rutgers, etc.). In these
instances we averaged their quality measures weighting each campus by its share in the total
faculty number of all campuses combined.
Data from TLO￿ s Websites
1. Inventor￿ s royalty share: This information was downloaded from the websites of each
university technology licensing o¢ ces during the summer of 2001. The net income received
by the university from licensing an invention is distributed between the inventor and the
university. The university allocates its share to various units such as the inventor￿ s
laboratory, department or college. The criterion we use for identifying the inventor share
is that the inventor must gain either cash ￿ ow rights or direct control rights over the
income. Thus, when the university IP policy states that the share accruing to the lab
was under the control of the inventor, we added it to the inventor￿ s share, but otherwise
we did not. Royalty shares were computed out of net license income after deducting
direct licensing expenses from gross income. We also made an adjustment for the TLO￿ s
overhead rate, when it was reported.
Other Data
1. Average Salary at the university level, i.e., not just hard science departments. Source:
NSF WebCASPAR Database System.(http://caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar).
2. Percentage of Tenured Faculty at the university level, i.e., not just hard science depart-
ments. Source: NSF WebCASPAR Database System.(http://caspar.nsf.gov/webcaspar).
3. Milken Institute Tech-Pole composite index
55A.2 Data Selection Process
1. Starting with the nine ￿les containing the Association of University Technology Managers￿
(AUTM) Annual Licensing Surveys for 1991-99 we compiled a list of 209 institutions
with licensing income and disclosure data for all or part of the 1991-99 period. These
institutions include American and Canadian universities, medical research institutes and
patent management ￿rms.
2. The size and quality measures from the 1993 National Survey of Graduate Faculty con-
ducted by the National Research Council (NRC) are available for universities with doc-
toral programs only. This reduces the sample of institutions with AUTM and NRC data
to 146.
3. Merging with the royalty share distribution data further reduced the number of insti-
tutions with AUTM, NRC and royalty share data to 102. Most teaching hospitals and
patent management ￿rms do not post royalty distribution information on the internet.
Since all but one (Albert Einstein Healthwork Network) of these institutions are univer-
sities, we refer to the observations as universities.
A.3 Structure of the Data
We have an panel data on 102 universities with non-missing license income data ranging from
T = 1 to T = 9 years. The distribution of universities with T = t is given in the second column
of the Table below,













Number of Observations 749 717
This gives a total of 749 university-year observations with non-missing license income
data. Tables 1￿ 4 rely on the full sample of 102 universities but the sample used in Tables
5-13 is smaller because of missing variables and observations with zero license income (we use
the log of license income). There are 18 observations with zero license income. Eight of these
observations, belong to four universities not having any non-zero license data. Thus, they are
excluded from the baseline sample used in the regressions. The remaining 10 observations
belong to 4 institutions having other non-zero license data so they remain in the baseline
regression sample. In particualr, the ￿short￿speci￿cations in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table
5 are based on 98 universities (102 - 4 universities with all their license data equal to zero).
Assigning a zero value to the dependent variable of the universities with zero license revenue,
and including them in the regression, did not change the parameter estimates.
Other control variables are also missing. Three universities have missing information on
the TLO foundation year so that the TLO age cannot be computed. Because two of these also
have zero license income data, we only have to drop 4 observations (and one university) on
account of missing TLO age from the baseline regression sample. In addition nine observations,
corresponding to 5 universities, have missing TLO size data and one observation has missing
data on R&D funding. These 10 observations, but not the universities, are dropped from the
baseline regression sample.
To summarise, a total of 32 observations and 5 universities are dropped from the base-
line regression sample because of zero licence income or other missing data. This leaves 717
57observations in 97 universities used in the ￿long￿speci￿cations in Table 5, columns (2), (4)
and (6). The distribution of universities with di⁄erent numbers of observations in the baseline
regression samples is given in the third column of the table.
58